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INCONSISTENCIES IN THE REGULATION OF ANTI-







This paper identifies the differences in the regulation of anti-circumvention in the EU by 
three different legislative instruments, namely the Information Society Directive, the 
Software Directive and the Conditional Access Directive and demonstrates the practical 
implications of those differences. The paper concludes that the great inconsistencies 
within the regulation of anti-circumvention in the EU demand a reevaluation of the 




Of all the issues of copyright policy in the last twenty years, probably the  
most controversial has been the issue of technological protection measures  
(TPMs). TPMs constitute self-help mechanisms, such as copy protection for DVDs,  
password protection for online services, and encryption of television broadcast  
signals, which are designed to prevent acts of infringement and exploitation of  
intellectual property rights by controlling copying or access to works.
1
 As it  
was anticipated that ways would be found to circumvent these copy and access  
controls, the legal systems of many countries provide TPMs legal support by  
giving to the right holders concerned specific protection when trying to enforce  
and manage their rights by technical means. These so-called anti-circumvention norms do 
not create or enlarge exclusive rights as such, but they enhance the exploitation and 
enforcement of exclusive rights by making it illegal either to circumvent TPMs or to offer 
services that enable circumvention.
2  
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The establishment of legal regimes for the protection of TPMs was not an easy 
decision though. The adoption of anti-circumvention norms and the policies that they 
should serve have been very controversial issues. In the debate divergent opinions have 
been expressed regarding the form that anti-circumvention norms should take. The EU 
legislature resorted to three different formulas for EU anti-circumvention norms, 
according to the sector which TPMs protect. In particular, anti-circumvention provisions 
can be found not in one or two, but in three Directives, namely in the Information Society 
Directive
3
, in the Software Directive
4
 and in the Conditional Access Directive.
5
 The 
Software Directive and the Information Society Directive protect copyright holders of 
computer programs and other works protected by copyright, including broadcasts, 
databases and performances respectively, whereas the Conditional Access Directive 
protects service providers from the unauthorized reception of their conditional access 
services, regardless of whether they contain works protected by copyright.
6
  
During the legislative process of the three Directives the Commission did not 
identify any reasons that would justify the differentiation in the legal treatment of TPMs 
according to the sector to which they are applied, nor is there any technical evidence that 
TPMs work differently for different forms of subject matter.
7
 Hence, one may assume 
that the existing differentiation among the anti-circumvention provision of the three 
Directives would be insignificant. On the contrary, the comparison among the anti-
circumvention provisions found in the Information Society Directive, the Software 
Directive and the Conditional Access Directive indicates that there are important 
differences in the established legal regimes with regard to the prohibited acts, the mens 
rea of the infringer, the circumvention means, the protected technological measures, the 
relation of the anti-circumvention provisions to contract law and to the limitations of 
copyright law. 
In that regard, this paper demonstrates the practical implications of the differences 
in the scope of application of the anti-circumvention norms according to the subject 
matter protected by TPMs. The paper concludes that there are great inconsistencies 
within the regulation of anti-circumvention, which demand a reevaluation of the policies 
that led to the adoption of the current form of EU anti-circumvention norms. 
 
2. Differences in the regulation of anti-circumvention in the EU 
2.1. The prohibited acts 
 
With respect to the Software Directive and the Conditional Access Directive the 
legislature opted to address the problem of circumvention at its source and solely target 
the intermediaries that enable consumers to circumvent TPMs instead of going against 
the wider public, in light of the enforcement and marketing issues that would be raised, 
whereas that protection was not deemed to be adequate for the protection of copyright 
works. Thus, the Information Society Directive condemns both circumvention per se and 
trafficking in circumvention devices, whereas the Software Directive and the Conditional 
Access Directive do not prohibit the act of circumvention as such.
8
 In other words, the 
EU anti-circumvention norms condemn viewers that circumvent copy controls embedded 
in DVDs featuring movies but they do not target either computer program users that 
circumvent TPMs to copy software, or viewers that circumvent TPMs embedded in their 
pay-TV decoders.  
Equally significant are the differences in the scope of application of the anti-
circumvention norms of the three Directives with regard to the wrongful acts that 
facilitate circumvention. The Information Society Directive requires Member States to 
censure the manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or 
rental, or possession for commercial purposes of circumventing devices of both access 
and rights controls.
9
 The Conditional Access Directive targets solely commercial acts that 
facilitate the circumvention of access controls
10
 and the Software Directive condemns 




Hence, the “possession of circumventing devices of access controls for 
commercial purposes” is the only wrongful act targeted by all three Directives. 
Illustrating how limited the common scope of application of the three Directives is, an 
example of such unlawful acts presents the possession of devices that circumvent access 
controls protecting computer programs or copyright works or the possession of illicit pay-
TV decoders by a provider of a website that offers unauthorised copies of songs, films, 
computer programs and TV broadcasts. Still, there is ambiguity regarding the meaning of 
the term “commercial use”, which may create confusion and differentiation among the 
interpretation of the term in the context of the three Directives. In particular, the notion of 
“commercial use”, which is not defined in the Software or the Conditional Access 
Directive, could vary from profit making purposes to any economic advantage.
12
  
However, the differences in the types of acts targeted by the three directives are 
far more significant. On the one hand, the Software and the Information Society 
Directives have a broader scope of application in comparison to the Conditional Access 
Directive,  to the extent that the act of “putting into circulation”, and the “manufacture, 
import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or rental” do not need to be 
conducted for commercial purposes.
13
 A computer expert who loans to her friends a 
circumventing device for TPMs embedded in music CDs or CDs with computer programs 
is infringing the norms of the Information Society Directive and the Software Directive, 
regardless of whether she receives any direct or indirect economic advantage; in contrast 
thereto, the computer expert is not liable according to the norms of the Conditional 
Access Directive, if she loans to her neighbors her illicit pay-TV decoder.  
On the other hand, the Software Directive has a more limited scope of application 
in comparison to the other two Directives to the extent that it does not target acts such as 
the “advertisement for sale or rental” or the “use of commercial communications” to 
promote circumventing devices or services.
14
 Hence a website that advertises devices 
circumventing TPMs that protect computer programs is not infringing according to the 
anti-circumvention norms of the Software Directive. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
Information Society Directive, the Software Directive does not target the manufacture 
and import of circumventing devices for non commercial purposes, when such devices 
are not subsequently put into circulation.
15
 In other words, the owner of copyright in 
computer programs cannot make use of the anti-circumvention provisions, when an end 
user of a program manufactured or imported a circumventing device, unless the copyright 
owner can prove, for example, that the end user loaned the device to third parties. 
 Summing up, only the Information Society Directive condemns the act of 
circumvention per se, whereas all three Directives target the making and dealing in 
devices that facilitate circumvention. Still, the scope of the European anti-circumvention 
provisions as regards the prohibited acts differs to a considerable degree. The anti-
circumvention provisions of the Information Society Directive have the broader scope of 
application of the three, whereas the Software Directive has a broader scope of 
application in comparison to the Conditional Access Directive as regards the circulation 
of circumventing devices, but a narrower scope of application as regards the manufacture, 
import and advertisement of circumventing devices.  
 
2.2. The mens rea of facilitators of circumvention 
 
Another difference of great significance among the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
three Directives concerns the required mens rea of the infringer. A distinction should be 
made between the required intent of circumventors of TPMs and the intent of people 
facilitating circumvention, as the two prohibitions target different groups of people and 
thus the interests that need to be protected by the legal order in each case differ. In 
particular, the actual circumventors of TPMs are the users of copyright works, the 
majority of whom may not have the technological knowledge to circumvent a TPM. In 
contrast thereto, the facilitators of circumvention are usually professionals or computer 
experts who manufacture or distribute circumventing devices and assist users to 
circumvent TPMs. As circumventing devices and services may also have additional non-
infringing uses, it is crucial to determine under which circumstances the manufacturer or 
distributor of such devices is deemed to be infringing the anti-circumvention norms of the 
three directives.  
 The three Directives have taken completely different approaches with regard to 
the required intent of the persons facilitating circumvention of TPMs.
16
 According to the 
Information Society Directive, if the means that facilitate circumvention have no other or 
only a limited commercially significant use other than to circumvent, then the mens rea 
of the person facilitating circumvention is irrelevant.
17
 Thus, if a device is primarily used 
for unauthorised circumvention of TPMs, but can be used for other legitimate purposes, a 
person commits an offence by manufacturing and selling such a device, even if the device 
was genuinely manufactured or sold for legitimate purposes. If the means facilitating 
circumvention have a commercially significant use other than to circumvent, the anti-
circumvention provisions implementing the Information Society Directive are infringed 
when someone promotes, advertises or markets those means with the intent that they are 
used for the purpose of circumvention, or she designs, produces, adapts or performs them 
with the intent that they are used primarily for the purpose of enabling or facilitating 
circumvention of any effective TPMs.
18
  
As regards the Software Directive, it has been argued that the distribution or 
possession of TPMs as an instance of vicarious liability does not presuppose intention or 
negligence, as long as the articles concerned are specifically intended to facilitate the 
removal or circumvention of any technical means that have been applied to protect a 
computer program.
19
 However, this statement appears to contradict itself. The required 
mens rea of the infringer is predicated on whether the “sole intended purpose” should be 
found according to the understanding of a third party, for example, a neutral observer or 
the average distributor of anti-circumvention devices or according to the intent of the 
actual distributor of anti-circumvention devices. The wording of the provision which 
refers to “sole intended” and not to “sole commercially significant” purpose, for example, 
supports the second interpretation. Thus, liability according to the Software Directive is 
always predicated on scienter (dolus malus), and in particular, the distributor of the 
device must intend it to be used by a third party to circumvent a TPM. 
Finally, the Conditional Access Directive does not require Member States to 
outlaw only the intentional facilitation of illicit devices, but it provides Member States 
with the discretion to condemn the commercial manufacture, distribution and promotion 
of infringing equipment or software, only if those activities are carried out in the 
knowledge or with reasonable grounds to know that the devices in question were illicit.
20
 
The legislative choice to outlaw the unintentional facilitation of circumvention 
has significant practical consequences on technological innovation. An electronics 
retailer who offers for sale components necessary to assemble a device that circumvents 
TPMs embedded in music CDs is liable for facilitation of circumvention, if those 
components are primarily used by the public to circumvent TPMs, regardless of whether 
the retailer is unaware of the destination of the components or whether she promoted 
them for other lawful uses. In contrast thereto, if the electronic components are used to 
assemble a device that circumvents TPMs which protect computer programs and those 
components have any other lawful use other than to circumvent effective TPMs, the 
retailer is liable only if she is distributing the components with the intention to facilitate 
the circumvention of TPMs.  Thus, the choice to outlaw the unintentional facilitation of 
circumvention under the Information Society Directive and also potentially under the 
Conditional Access Directive, causes uncertainty within the markets for electronics and 
inhibits the development and circulation of technologies with additional beneficial uses. 
In contrast thereto, owners of copyright in computer programs bear the additional burden 
to prove that distributors and possessors of circumventing devices intended that the 
devices were used to circumvent TPMs, which, however, may fuel innovation.   
 
2.3. The means of circumvention  
2.3.1. The purpose served by circumventing means 
 
The analysis above highlighted a significant difference between the Information Society, 
the Software and the Conditional Access Directives as regards the types of circumvention 
devices or services that fall under their scope. According to Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Information Society Directive a device or service is considered infringing the anti-
circumvention norms if its “primary purpose” is to enable or facilitate circumvention of 
TPMs, whereas pursuant to Article 7(1)(c) of the Software Directive the facilitations of 
circumvention is “sole intended purpose” of an infringing device. A device or service that 
has an intended purpose other than the unauthorised removal or circumvention of TPMs 
applied to computer programs, for example to allow software programmed to operate 
with Windows also to operate with Linux, does not violate the anti-circumvention norms.  
However, the same device may be considered infringing, if it circumvents TPMs applied 
to works other than computer programs, as in that case the copyright holder needs to 
prove the lower “primary purpose” standard, namely that the device is primarily designed 
to enable or facilitate circumvention, regardless of whether it may also have intended 
secondary legal uses.
21
  Finally, an “illicit device” does not need to satisfy even the lower 
“primary purpose” standard in order to invoke the application of the Conditional Access 
Directive, since “any equipment or software designed or adapted to give access to a 
protected service” falls within the scope of the provision.
22
 Thus, potential legal uses of 
an “illicit device” are of no importance for the application of anti-circumvention 




2.3.1. The nature of circumventing means: devices or services 
 
Another important difference regarding the scope of application of the EU Directives 
regards the nature of circumventing means as encompassing services. This distinction is 
of great significance as the Software Directive and the Conditional Access Directive do 
not target the act of circumvention per se. Still, a professional who circumvents TPMs 
that protect computer programs or conditional access services for the benefit of third 
parties could be held liable if the offer of circumvention services for commercial 
purposes was condemned. This is not the case though for the Conditional Access 
Directive, whereas there is disagreement as to whether the scope of application of the 
anti-circumvention provisions of the Software Directive extends to services.  
 The Information Society Directive explicitly targets “devices, products or 
components or the provision of services”.
24
 An equally elaborate definition of “illicit 
devices” is included in the Conditional Access Directive, which instructs Member States 
to prohibit commercial acts regarding “any equipment or software designed or adapted to 
give access to a protected service”.
25
 Thus the scope of application of the Information 
Society Directive is broader to the extent that it also targets services enabling 
circumvention, whereas the Conditional Access Directive targets solely devices and code. 
In contrast thereto, the Software Directive targets “any means facilitating the 
unauthorised removal or circumvention of TPMs” without providing any further 
explanation regarding the meaning of the term. The broad term “any means” logically 
encompasses “devices, products, or components” within the meaning of Article 6 of the 
Information Society Directive.
26
 However, there is disagreement as to whether the 
expression “any means” as used in the text of the Software Directive, extends to services. 
 Hence, although all three Directives target the provision of devices facilitating 
circumvention, only the Information Society Directive elaborately condemns the 
provision of circumvention services. The Conditional Access Directive does not target 
facilitators of circumvention who offer their services to third parties, whereas there is 
legal uncertainty as to whether services are fall within the scope of application of the 
Software Directive.  
 
 2.4. Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright 
 
The most common criticism against TPMs is that they frequently block non-infringing 
uses of copyright works. A number of scholars have examined the consequences of anti-
circumvention regulation on the privileges enjoyed by end users according to 
“traditional” copyright law and they struggled with the question of whether and how anti-
circumvention law could better accommodate copyright exceptions.
27 
 On such an 
important issue, the EU legislature has taken different stands as to the extent and the 
method that exceptions and limitations of copyright are accommodated under each 
Directive. 
 The Information Society Directive requires the protection of all TPMs that 
prevent or restrict uses or access not authorised by the right holders, regardless of 
whether the users attempting access or use can take advantage of some of the exceptions 
established in Article 5 of the Directive.  Article 6(3) of the Information Society 
Directive defines TPMs as technologies designed to prevent or restrict acts “which are 
not authorized” by the concerned rightholders and thus it makes no reference to the 
technological measures that impede violation of copyright. 
As a response to concerns regarding the expansion of the right of copyright 
holders to the detriment of the public, the Information Society Directive encourages right 
holders to provide a voluntary mechanism in order to make available to beneficiaries of 
certain exceptions permitted under the Directive the means of benefiting from them and it 




 However, the Information Society Directive provides an exclusion from this 
requirement for “works or other subject matter made available to the public on agreed 
contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them”.
29
 This provision effectively annuls the 
established voluntary method of addressing copyright exceptions in the online 
environment, as the norm is that online applications allow members of the public to 
access works from a place and time individually chosen by them, after they have agreed 
to standard form contractual provisions (take-it-or-leave) set out by the provider of the 
work.
30
 In short, the Information Society Directive privileges a rule of prevalence of 
contract over exceptions in the online environment. 
For example, an academic who wants to copy parts of a movie for her class 
cannot raise the defence of “illustration for teaching” against the owner of the copyright 
in the movie and circumvent the TPMs that protect it. In such a case, the copyright holder 
is encouraged to take voluntary measures to accommodate the needs of the teacher, or 
else the Member State where this incident occurs shall take appropriate measures to 
ensure that right holders make available to the teacher the means of benefiting from that 
exception. However, if the protected movie is streamed online through a conditional 
access service, the broadcaster bears no obligation to take voluntary measures to 
accommodate the needs of the teacher. 
 As regards the Software Directive, it has been argued that Article 7(1)(c) applies 
also in cases where the means of circumvention are used only in order to carry out acts 
that do not require authorisation on the ground of an exception of a restrictive act.
31
 The 
reasoning, which was also adopted by the High Court of England & Wales in Sony v Ball,  
is that in cases where circumvention takes place to enable the exercise of an exemption, 
the “sole intended purpose” of the device remains circumvention and circumvention is 
“unauthorised”. Thus, Article 7(1)(c) is not limited to situations where the person knows 
or has reasons to believe that the means will be used to make infringing copies.
32
 
However, this reasoning does not explain what the word “unauthorized” adds to the 
meaning of the provision. If the legislator wished to exclude from the scope of Article 
7(1)(c) only circumvention devices which have more functions, other than to circumvent, 
such as a personal computer, the provision would target devices the sole intended purpose 
of which would be to facilitate circumvention. The inclusion of the term “unauthorised” 
establishes a requirement that the copyright holder must have the power to prohibit 
circumvention on a basis other than the anti-circumvention provisions, such as copyright 
or contract law. The wording of the provision suggests that there should be a link 
between copyright infringement and infringement of the anti-circumvention provisions 
and, thus, exceptions to copyright should be regarded as prevailing over the anti-
circumvention norms established by the Software Directive. It is likely that the 
interpretation followed by the High Court was prompted by policy considerations. If the 
provision had been limited to situations where the person knows or has reasons to believe 
that the means will be used to make infringing copies, there would have been pragmatic 
difficulties in applying it to computer programs. 
Furthermore, the Software Directive establishes a rule that certain exceptions will 
prevail over contractual terms, so that contractual provisions contrary to the exceptions 
referred to in Articles 5(2) and (3) and 6 are deemed null and void.
33
 Thus, the making of 
a back-up copy, the observation, study or testing of the functioning of a computer 
program and decompilation to achieve interoperability are raised to the level of 
guaranteed rights of access and use, which cannot be by-passed by contractual provisions 
offering more protection to copyright holders. 
Finally, the Conditional Access Directive does not contain within its text any 
limitations, or any provision regarding its relationship to copyright exceptions. The lack 
of explicit mention of copyright limitations led commentators to interpret Recital 21 of 
the Directive, which states that the Directive is without prejudice to the application of 
intellectual property rights, as signifying that the Directive is also without prejudice to 
any exceptions to intellectual property rights. Hence the relationship between the 
Conditional Access Directive and copyright exceptions would be unclear.
34
 However 
such an interpretation disregards the scope of application of the Conditional Access 
Directive and the nature and scope of application of copyright exceptions. The copyright 
exceptions and limitations are defences that a defendant may rely upon when sued for 
copyright infringement. Hence they may be raised vis-a-vis copyright holders, and not 
towards third parties. They do not constitute an absolute right for users of copyright 
works. On the contrary, they allow certain uses of copyright works, which would 
otherwise infringe the copyright of protected works. Thus, users could raise the defence 
against broadcasters that they benefit from copyright exceptions, only to the extent that 
broadcasters raise claims as licensees of copyright holders. However, the object of 
protection of the Conditional Access Directive is the remunerated service and not 
copyright. Since broadcasters enjoy a distinct right to remuneration based on a different 
legal basis than copyright law, the exception to copyright cannot extend its application 
beyond the scope of copyright law. Furthermore, as the services in question are protected 
also when their content is not protected by copyright at all, logic dictates that those 
services will be protected also when their content is a copyright work, but users can 
benefit from an exception. 
 
4. Conclusion 
While the need for protection of TPMs is unequivocal according to European anti-
circumvention norms, in practice, the degree of protection for TPMs varies according to 
the protected subject matter and is often uncertain, as the wording of the anti-
circumvention provisions in the EU is complex, difficult to interpret and in some cases 
contradictory. Only the Information Society Directive targets the act of circumvention per 
se and the targeted preparatory acts to circumvention also differ under the three 
Directives. The rules clarifying the required mens rea of the facilitator of anti-
circumvention as well as the characteristics of the circumventing means differ under the 
norms of the three Directives. Finally, the European legislature took different approaches 
to the question of whether exceptions to copyright should prevail over the anti-
circumvention norms and any contractual arrangements or vice versa.  
 The differences in the scope of application of anti-circumvention norms according 
to the protected subject matter reflect different underlying policies that dictated the 
adoption of the one or the other approach. The choice to pursue the goals of anti-
circumvention by targeting organized intermediaries who facilitate circumvention or the 
public who use the means made available to them entails the question of whether we 
should promote an aggressive prosecution system”; on the one hand, it is more effective 
in shaping the conscience of the public that circumventing TPMs is illegal and thus will 
lessen the demand for devices and services that enable circumvention. On the other hand, 
it raises enforcement and proportionality issues as only an insignificant part of the 
infringers can be prosecuted, and thus those people will be treated as scapegoats to 
“scare” the rest of the public and make it conform to the “demands” of the law. Secondly, 
the approach taken under the Software Directive not to target the use of commercial 
communications aims to ensure the freedom of speech that media should enjoy and tries 
to relief them from the burden of checking if what they publicise infringes anti-
circumvention norms or not. A third issue of major importance is whether the anti-
circumvention norms should make their enforcement easier for right holders at the cost of 
impeding technological innovation or vice versa. In particular, the lack of a required mens 
rea for the facilitators of circumvention and the adoption of “primary purpose” instead of 
“sole intended purpose”, as the criterion that a device should serve in order to fall under 
the definition of circumventing device according to the Information Society Directive, 
reflect a policy choice to broaden the scope of application of the anti-circumvention 
provisions to entail devices and services with beneficial uses that can contribute to 
technological innovation; In contrast thereto, the legislature opted to allow the production 
and use of such devices under the Software Directive, at the cost of making the 
enforcement of its anti-circumvention norms less effective. Potential infringers may claim 
that their devices have other uses and right holders bear the additional burden to prove 
that the infringers were aware of the circumventing function of their devices or services. 
Finally, the prevalence of anti-circumvention provisions over user exceptions and 
limitations and contract law or vice versa is a hotly debated issue that is dealt with 
differently under each Directive and which allegedly affects the balance that copyright 
law should serve.  
 
Those concerns can be answered only after a re-evaluation of the policies that led to the 
adoption and to the current form of anti-circumvention norms. There is a need to explore 
whether different policy reasons dictate the different scope of anti-circumvention norms 
according to the protected subject matter, or whether the indicated differences are a result 
of inconsistent and inefficient protection of TPMs.  
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